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Abstract
In this paper, we present a new approach, called
Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking (FDPM), to
perform a large-scale IP traceback to defend against
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In a
DDoS attack the victim host or network is usually
attacked by a large number of spoofed IP packets
coming from multiple sources. IP traceback is the
ability to trace the IP packets to their sources without
relying on the source address field of the IP header.
FDPM provides many flexible features to trace the IP
packets and can obtain better tracing capability than
current IP traceback mechanisms, such as
Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM), and
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM). The flexibilities
of FDPM are in two ways, one is that it can adjust the
length of marking field according to the network
protocols deployed; the other is that it can adjust the
marking rate according to the load of participating
routers. The implementation and evaluation
demonstrates that the FDPM needs moderately only a
small number of packets to complete the traceback
process; and can successfully perform a large-scale IP
traceback, for example, trace up to 110,000 sources in
a single incident response. It has a built-in overload
prevention mechanism, therefore this scheme can
perform a good traceback process even it is heavily
loaded.
1. Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are a
serious problem on the Internet. Recent analysis shows
it causes a large amount of financial losses every year.
For example, in 2004, 30% organizations report denial
of service attacks in Australia according to the
Computer Crime and Security Survey [1], which cause
AU$378,000 total annual loss. In the US, the denial of
service attack causes total annual loss of
US$26,064,050 [2].
A DDoS attack is an availability attack, for it is
characterized by an explicit attempt from an attacker to
prevent legitimate users from using the desired
resource [3]. With the IP address spoofing techniques,
the source IP addresses in the attacking packets are
usually counterfeited and look like having nothing to
do with the attackers themselves. Therefore, we must
rely on some specific IP traceback mechanisms to
locate the sources of attackers and punish them. In this
paper, we mainly discuss about how to locate the
attacking sources, how to detect possible attacks and
control the attacking traffic can be found in [4].
IP traceback is to trace the IP packets to their
origins [5]; it provides a system with the ability to
identify true sources of the IP packets. In this paper, a
new IP traceback scheme named Flexible Deterministic
Packet Marking (FDPM) is proposed. The major
advantage of FDPM is that it needs moderately only a
small number (theoretically from 2 to 32) of packets, to
trace up to 110,000 sources in a single incident
response. Moreover, it can selectively adjust the
marking process according to processing load of the
participating router. Therefore, it avoids the overload
problem of the router.
2. DDoS Attack and Its Countermeasures
2.1 DDoS Attack
A typical DDoS attack against the victim host or
network involves sending a large number of packets to
a destination, thus causing excessive amounts of
endpoint, and possibly transit network bandwidth to be
consumed [6]. The attack usually starts from multiple
sources and it aims at a single target. Many DDoS
attacks exploit spoofed IP addresses. When the assault
starts, the real attacker hides the identity by the IP
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spoofing techniques. When hundreds or thousands of
hosts are participating in the attack by sending spoofed
packets, it is very challenging to quickly control the
large-scale attack.
2.2 DDoS Countermeasures
Traditional DDoS defending mechanisms include
detecting mechanisms and reacting mechanisms. The
common detection mechanism is to monitor some
network characteristics such as the traffic volume [7].
After detecting the malicious actions of DDoS attacks,
the defence system turns into the reacting stage, such as
congestion control [8]. This stream of defence
approaches is classified as passive defence [9] because
it only responses after the malicious actions are
detected.
Recently the DDoS defence evolves into another
stream, active defence [4]. The aim of the active
defence system is to control the attack as soon as
possible, and reduce the damage to the minimum
degree. An active defence system includes intrusion
surveillance system, attack control system and
traceback system. In order to perform an active DDoS
defence, IP traceback is one of the key techniques. It is
beneficial to control and punish the attacks.
2.3 Current Traceback Approaches
Current IP traceback mechanisms can be classified
into four main categories as link testing [10][11],
messaging [12][13], logging [14][15][16], and packet
marking. FDPM falls into the packet marking category.
The idea of packet marking is to insert traceback
data into the IP packet on its way through the various
routers from the attack source to the destination. Then
the marks in the IP packets can be used to deduce the
path of the malicious traffic. Probabilistic Packet
Marking (PPM) [17] is one of the packet marking
methods. The assumption of PPM is that the attacking
packets are much more frequent than the normal
packets. It lets routers mark the packets with path
information probabilistically and lets the victim
reconstruct the attack path by using the marked
packets. The PPM encodes the information in rarely
used field within the IP header. In order to save storage
in IP header field, compressed edge fragment sampling
method is used. It requires less traffic volume than
ICMP traceback, but it encounters computational
difficulties as the numbers of attack sources increases.
Because the number of packets needed to reconstruct
the attack path depends on the number of packets
which are marked by the further router in the attack
path.
Another stream of packet marking methods is not
using the probabilistic assumption above, for example,
the Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) [18] and the
Deterministic Bit Marking [19]. These schemes have
many advantages over others, such as simple
implementation, no bandwidth requirement, less
computation overhead, free from the falsified marking,
etc. However, to perform a successful traceback,
enough packets must be collected to reconstruct the
attacking path.
2.4 Scalability Problem of Current
Approaches
Current packet marking schemes all have scalability
problem. PPM only works well when there is a small
number of attacking sources (order of 102). In a large-
scale DDoS attack scenario, thousands (or even more)
of attacking hosts and routers are involved. Thus PPM
is not able to traceback the large-scale attacking
sources.
On the other hand, DPM utilizes a fixed length mark
that consists of the 16-bit ID field and the 1-bit
Reserved Flag (RF) in the IP header. Theoretically, it
can scale up to thousands (order of 103) of IP source
traceback. However, when it is implemented in the real
network environment, the hash collision problem will
reduce the number greatly to less than half of the
theoretical value. Our approach solves the scalability
problem by increasing the capability of traceback up to
110,000 (order of 105) sources in a single incident
response.
3. Design of FDPM
3.1 Marking scheme
When an IP packet enters the protected network, it
will be marked by the interface close to the source of
the packet on an edge ingress router. The mark will not
be changed when the packet traverses the network. The
source IP addresses are stored in the marks. At any
point within the network, the source IP addresses can
be assembled when they are necessary. Because all the
packets will be marked by the very first router the
packet passes, mark-spoofing by the attackers is not
effective for this scheme.
Because of the limit of the length of mark, at least 2
packets are needed to carry a 32-bit source IP address.
A segment number is also assigned to the mark,
because when reconstructing the packet, the segment
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order of the source IP address bits must be known.
After all the segments corresponding to the same
ingress address have arrived to the destination, the
source IP address of the packets can be reconstructed.
In order to keep a track on a set of IP packets that are
used for reconstruction, the identities shown the
packets come from the same source must be given. A
hash of the ingress address is kept in the mark, known
as the digest. This digest will always remain the same
for a FDPM interface from which the packets enter the
network. It provides the victim end the ability to
recognize which packets being analysed are from a
same source, although the digest itself cannot tell the
real address.
The packet processing consumes resources such as
memory and computing capacity of a participating
router. Therefore, it is possible for a router to be
overloaded when there are a large number of arrival
packets. Flow-based marking is proposed to solve the
overload problem. When the load of a router exceeds a
threshold, the router will discern the most possible
attacking packets from other packets then selectively
mark these packets. This will alleviate the load of the
router while still obtain the marking function.
3.2 Utilization of IP Header
DPM utilize fixed 17 bits in the IP header to store
the marking information. In FDPM, the length of mark
bits is flexible according to the real network
environment. It ranges from 17 bits to 25 bits (8-bit
TOS, 16-bit ID, and 1bit RF). The TOS parameters are
to be used to guide the selection of the actual service
parameters when transmitting a datagram through a
particular network [20]. However, the TOS field has
been rarely supported by most routers in the past. Some
proposed standards such as Differentiated Services in
TOS [21] are still under developing. Therefore, in
FDPM scheme, the TOS field will be used to store the
mark under some circumstances. The other two fields
in the IP header are also exploited, one is Fragment ID,
and the other is the Reserved Flag. Because less than
0.25% of all Internet traffic is fragments [22], this field
can be overloaded without causing serious
compatibility problems.
3.3 Encoding
The main idea of FDPM encoding of the mark is
similar as the encoding of DPM. However, before the
FDPM mark can be generated, the length of mark must
be decided according to different network protocols
deployed within the protected network. According to
the different situations, the length of mark can be 24
bits long at most, 19 bits, and 16 bits at least (The 1-bit
of the Reserved Flag is not counted because this bit is
used for control purpose, which is introduced in the
later part).
The ingress IP address is divided into k segments,
which means these k parts are carried by k packets to
reconstruct one source IP address. The segment
number keeps the order of the address bits. And the
address digest enables the reconstruction process to
recognize the packets being analysed are from a same
source. The pseudo code of encoding is shown below.
Marking process at router R, edge interface
A, in network N
if N does not utilize TOS
Reserved_Flag:=0
7th and 8th bit of TOS:=0
Length_of_Mark:=24
else
Reserved_Flag :=1
if N utilizes Differentiated Services
Field or N support Precedence and
Priority
7th and 8th bit of TOS:=1
Length_of_Mark:=16
else if N support Precedence but not
Priority
7th bit of TOS:=1
8th bit of TOS:=0
Length_of_Mark:=19
else if N support Priority but not
Precedence
7th bit of TOS:=0
8th bit of TOS:=1
Length_of_Mark:=19
end if
end if
Decide the lengths of each part in the mark
Digest:=H(A)
loop i=0 to k-1
Mark[i].Digest:=Digest
Mark[i].Segment_number:=i
Mark[i].Address_bit:=A[i]
end loop
for each incoming packet p
j:=random integer from 0 to k-1
write Mark[j] into w.Mark
3.4 Reconstruction
The reconstruction process includes two steps, one
is mark recognition, and the other is address recovery.
When each packet that is used to reconstruct the source
IP address arrives to the victim, it is put into a cache,
because the in some cases the processing speed is
lower than the arrival speed of the incoming packets.
The cache can also output the packet information to
another process unit, by this design the different
reconstruction methods can be applied and compared
with each other. By differentiating the fields in the IP
header, the length of the mark and which fields in the
IP header can be recognized.
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The second step, the address recovery, will analyse
the mark and store the mark into a recovery table. The
column of the table is k, which means how many
segments are used to carry the source address in the
packets. Each column in the same row stores the bits in
the same IP address which is carried by different
coming packets. The row of the table means the entry;
usually each digest owns one entry. However, the same
digest may have several entries. Because the digest is
the information of hashed source IP address, but is
shorter than the IP address, different source IP
addresses may have the same digest. When this
collision occurs, more than one entry may be created in
order to keep as much as possible information. The
DPM reconstruction uses a fix size recovery table,
which is unable to handle the situation of digest
collision. The pseudo code is shown below.
Reconstruction at victim V, in network N
for each packet p
mark recognition (length and fields)
if all fields in one entry are filled
output the source IP
delete the entry
else
if same digest and segment
number exist
create new entry
fill all the address
bits into them
else
fill the address bits
into entry
end if
end if
3.5 Flow-based marking
The idea of flow-based marking is to mark the
packets selectively according to the flow information
when the router is under a high load. Therefore, it can
reduce the load of router; while it still can maintain the
marking function. The aim of flow-based marking is to
mark the most likely attacking packets, then let the
reconstruction end reconstruct the source by using a
minimum number of packets. This process is similar to
some congestion control scheme [23], which is to
isolate the flows that have an unfair share of bandwidth
and drop the packets in those flows.
The data structures include a dynamic flow table T
and a FIFO queue Q. Each record in T stands for a
flow. Here the flow means the group of packets that
have some defined specific subset of identifiers and are
in the Q at a certain time. In order to simplify the
problem, packets are classified into different flows
according to the destination IP address in the IP
header. The flow records in T are hashed values of the
destination IP addresses and the number of packets
from this flow in the queue Q. The algorithm of flow-
based marking is shown below. There are two load
thresholds Lmax and Lmin. Lmax is the threshold that
controls the whole packet marking, which means the
router will not work properly if its load exceeds this
value. The load threshold Lmin means if the load
exceeds this value, the router can still work, but it must
reduce the marking load. max_pkts is a threshold to
control whether to mark the packet or not. These values
can be set according to different real situations in
routers.
if (load of router R > the threshold Lmax)
Do not mark any packets
Turn on congestion control mechanisms
else if (load of router R > Lmin)
Turn on flow-based marking at R, edge
interface A, in network N
for each packet p
check the number of packets
npkts from T in the Q
if(npkts == 0, means no such
flow in T)
add a new entry in T,
set its npkts = 1
else if(npkts < max_pkts)
npkts ++
else
mark the packet
according to the
encoding procedure
endif
insert this packet into Q
if Q is full
dequeue
endif
endif
4. Analysis and Evaluation
4.1 Theoretical Analysis
The theoretical maximum number of the attacker
sources that DPM can trace is only 2048. Moreover,
this number is obtained without considering other
factors such as the digest collision, network traffic
condition, IP packet fragment, and so on. In the real
network environment, the number is even less. Because
of the increased mark length, the FDPM scheme offers
a defence system much stronger capability to trace
multiple attacker sources. The theoretical maximum
number of sources which can be traced in by FDPM is
262144, which is 128 times of that of DPM. Figure 1
shows the comparison of maximum number of sources
can be traced under different situations by FDPM and
DPM.
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Figure 1: Comparison of theoretical maximum
number of sources can be traced
Figure 2: Comparison of practical maximum
number of sources can be traced
4.2 Implementation
We test this traceback scheme by a network
simulator, SSFNet, and gathered the experimental data
for analysis. The test results show FDPM can
efficiently trace IP packets with better reliability than
others. Three new Java packages are embedded into
SSFNet, which are Encoding sub-system,
Reconstruction sub-system and Flow-based Marking
sub-system. PJW Hash function [24] is chosen because
it is fast and it has a good ability to distribute keys
throughout the hash table. The latter attribute
minimizes collisions and prevents data items with
similar values from hashing to just one part of the hash
table. When the number of segments used increases,
the non-collision rates are stable below 0.45. Under the
most circumstances tuning hash functions can be
difficultly done because hash tuning requires
considerable empirical testing, and it largely depends
on what data set is used.
The practical average maximum numbers of sources
can be traced under different situations are shown
Figure 2. Although in the reconstruction process, all
possible source addresses are recorded by creating the
new digest entries, it also brings the false positive. If
the amendment for the collision of the digest is
ignored, it brings the high missing probability.
Compared with the theoretical analysis in the section
before, although in the practical experiments the
maximum source number is not as large as the
theoretical value, in FDPM with 24 bits digest, it still
can trace more than 110,000 different sources.
4.3 Overload Prevention
In section 3.5 we discussed the overload problem.
When the router is under high load, it must reduce the
marking process. If the coming packets are marked in a
random manner, (which means some packets are
marked, some are not marked, randomly, in order to
reduce the load of the router), the reconstruction end
will use more packets to reconstruct the sources than
the flow-based marking. Figure 3 shows when the
router use 2 packets to carry a source IP address (k=2),
10% of the packets are attacking packets, the marking
efficiency (that is measured by the number needed to
reconstruct a source IP address and the marked rate of
all the packets passing through the router) in flow-
based marking and random marking.
Figure 3: Marking efficiency in flow-based
marking and random marking
From the figure we can see the random marking can
not control when to mark and which packets to mark
because it randomly selects packets to mark. Therefore,
both attacking packets and normal packets receive the
same possibility to be marked. On the other hand, by
using flow-based marking, the attacking packets have
more chances to be marked. Thus in the reconstruction
end, less number of packets are needed to reconstruct
the source. For example, if only 4% of the packets are
marked, which add the router a very little load, about
10 packets are needed to reconstruct the source.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking
(FDPM) to perform a large-scale IP traceback is
presented. A comparison between PPM, DPM and
FDPM is shown in table 1. The implementation and
evaluation demonstrates that the FDPM needs
moderately a small number of packets to complete the
traceback process and requires little computation work.
This scheme is a powerful approach to defend against
large-scale DDoS attacks.
Table 1: A comparison between PPM, DPM and
FDPM
Criterion PPM DPM FDPM
Number of packets
needed for traceback 10
3 102 102
Sources can be traced 102 103 105
Computation Load High Medium Low
Overload Prevention None None Good
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